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The renascence of the stock market has been
one of the more newsworthy aspects of the
1975-76 economic recovery. This spring, after
a suitable period of suspense, the closely
watched Dow Jones Industrial Average broke
through the four-digit barrier which had not
been broached since the January 1973 peak.
Stock prices surged ahead on a rising volume of
transactions. The recovery ofeconomic activity
promised a higher stream of future profits, and
the price/earnings ratio-a barometer of the
state of investor expectations-made at least a
partial recovery from its 1974 trough.
Another important development has been the
upswing in the issuance of new equity shares,
amidst the hospitable environment created by
rising prices and heightened investor expecta-
tions. Corporations have attempted to maxi-
mize the amount of new capital at their com-
mand without unduly diluting the earnings of
shares already outstanding. Small firms, with a
limited ability to raise new capital, have gone
"public" and sold shares of ownership to in-
vestors. In 1975, nearly 25 percent of total
long-term financing raised inthe capital markets
was secured in the equities markets. Yet, de-
spite the recent increase, equity financing in the
lasttwo decades has remained arelatively minor
source of new corporate financing, generally
averaging about 10 percent of the funds raised
in the financial markets.
In fact, over the past two decades, corpora-
tions have frequently been forced to go to mar-
ket with new shares at unfavorable times. This
reflects the fact that equity is only part of the
capital structure of corporations. Corporate
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balance sheets have been transformed since the
mid-1950's, with corporations makingextensive
use of the debt markets to modify the composi-
tion of their capital base, despite the rising cost
of such funds. On the surface, this situation
might seem difficult to explain. However; a
more thorough examination suggests that there
are sound economic explanations of the changes
occurring in corporate balance sheets over the
past 20 years. Both the shift to debt of earlier
years and the recent corporate response to ris-
ing inflation can be viewed as a matter of cor-
porate treasurers trying to find the best mix
of equity and debt in response to changing
conditions.
Our examination of this subject gives rise to
three basic questions. First, has a shift actually
occurredin the composition of corporatecapital
structures? Second, how vulnerable have lever-
aged corporations become to the inflation of the
1970's and to the longer-term changes in the tax
structure? Finally, to what extent did the neces-
sity for selling equity into a rather unfavorable
market spring from the need to lessen the ex-
posure of leveraged corporations?
Changes in the corporate capital structure
follow a clearly discernible sequence. An in-
crease in corporate debt, relative to equity, re-
sults in higher leverage. The higher leverage
has a two-fold effect; it leads first to an increase
in profits available to stockholders, but at the
same time, it increases the risks inherent in a
greater dependence upon debt financing. The
resulting increase in risk may lead corporate
treasurers to sell more equity relative to debt,
leading to a decline in the leverage of the cor-
porate capital structure. In essence, this is justwhat has happened over the past 20 years, as
this paper shows by its analysis of the changes
in capital structure and their impact onthe cap-
italmarket.
Factors affectingreturn to equity
In a pioneeringwork, Franco Modigliani and
Merton Miller demonstrated that, under certain
conditions, the market value of a corporation-
outstanding equity plus debt-is independent of
its capital structure.
1 Given this premise, the
introduction of debt into the capital structure
of a firm increases the expected rate of return
on a share of stock by an amount equal to the
spread between the expected rate of return and
the interest rate on bonds times the debt to
equity ratio (i.e., leverage).
where: i = expected rate of return on the equity
to thefirm.
P = internal rate of return for the firm.
(Firms have differing risk characteristics and
appropriate P's will thus vary from firm to
firm.)
r rate of interest payable on the firm's out-
standingbonds.
D=value of the firm's outstanding debt.
E = value ofthe firm's outstandingstock.
This formula says that the return on equity, i,
depends upon the internal rate of return plus the
spread between P and the market rate of inter-
est and the capital structure of the firm (D/E,
the ratio of outstanding debt to equity). If the
risk associated with the stream of income is low,
the firm can increase its expected rate of return
by issuing debt. The price that the firm must
pay is the increased risk on its return, because
the reduced share of equity in total capital must
bearall of the riskinherentin the profits stream.
2
For the individual corporation, investment will
be expanded as long as P exceeds the market
rate of interest. The limiting case for all firms
is i=r. At this point, the expected return on
assets (i) is equal to the market rate of interest
(r), and firms will cease borrowing.
Equation 1 only holds in a situation where
there is no direct income tax, and must be modi-
fied to be applicable to the U.S. Where cor-
porate-bond interest payments are deductible
from corporate income, we have the following:
t) 7r t = (X-rD (1 (2)
Benefits of leverage
The role of leverage in the composition of
corporate capital structures has been argued for
years, and cannot yet be said to be resolved to
anyone's complete satisfaction. At one end of
the spectrum, Modigliani and Miller argue that
where: X = total income, including the return
to debt generatedbythe firm
t = corporateincome-tax rate
n = net income available for common stock-
holders
rD = cost of debt service (interest rate times
outstandingdebt)
Equations (1) and (2) contain all three of the
elements which have contributed to the change
in corporate balance-sheets over the past two
decades.
The first element is leverage, or the ratio of
debt to equity. If the return on a firm's total
assets consistently exceeds the market rate of
interest, the firm has an incentive to borrow in
the market, thus increasing the return to equity.
The second factor is the corporate tax rate and
the deductibility of bond interest. To the extent
that bond interest payments are a deductible
business expense, the government assumes a
part of the risk of borrowing to increase invest-
ment. Government risk sharing does not de-
crease total risk taking in the economy; this will
normally increase in response to corporate taxes
as companies move to a riskier but higher-yield
leverage position in order to get back part of
the income government has taxed away.3
The last element in the picture is the interest
rate. The high market rates at which corpora-
tions have had to borrow in recent years have
made debt a relatively less attractive source of
new funds, and have reduced the prospects of
increasing the returns to equity through raising
the leverage of the capital structure.
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fluctuated for several years, and then stabilized
near 44 percent throughout the 1969-75 peri-
od.7 The stability maintained during the 1957-
69 period, and again during the 1969-75 period,
strongly suggests that corporations desired the
particular capital structure existing during each
of those periods.
The purpose of increasing leverage is to in-
crease the return to common stockholders. By
introducing relatively more debt into the capital
structure and increasing the debt!equity ratio,
corporate treasurers seek to increase the return
on total assets to improve their return to equity.
Chart 2 describes the relation between the
spread in the return to equity and the return on
assets for the two periods of relatively stable
leverage. Although there is a certain amount of
Chart 2
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the average cost of capital is completely in-
dependent of the degree of leverage.
4 Ezra
Solomon expresses the more traditional view,
wherein increased leverage affects market value
because total earnings rise relative to the in-
creased use of debt capital, causing lower costs.
5
However, all agree that, although leverage may
be safely increased within a certain range, fur-
ther increases will adversely affect equity earn-
ings.6
Whatever their reasoning, corporation trea-
surers began to alter the debt-equitymix oftheir
capital portfolios in the mid 1960's (Chart 1).
The relative costs of alternative sources of cap-
ital funds was an incidental but by no means
negligible consideration in the determination of
the capital structure, but the ultimate objective
of the shift was to expand the share of earnings
accruing to the firm's common-stock holders.
The experience of the 1957-65 period illus-
trates in vivid detail the advantages of debt
financing to increase the leverage of the cor-
porate capital structure. Within rather narrow
limits, the debt!equity ratio (i.e., leverage) of a
selected group of corporations remained near







27overlap in the yield spread in the two sets of
observations, this could be expected in view of
the highly cyclical nature of the return to equity.
The change in the composition of the. cor-
porate capital structure that took place between
1957-64 and 1969-75 res~lted ina distinct up-
ward shift in the return to shareholders. With
a greaterproportion of debt included in the cap-
ital base, the spread rose from a range of about
21h to 5 percent to a rangeof 4 to 71h percent.
This finding supports the first premise of this
paper; viz., corporate treasurers changed the
composition of the corporate capital structure
in a successful effort to improve the earnings of
common stockholders.
Sources of corporate funds
Corporations thus can be seen as altering
their leverage positions by changing the propor-
tion of equity and debt funds in·response to a
given capital need. But as all corporate trea-
surers know, other financing sources are also
important. Indeed, internal sources of funds-
also known as cash flow-are the mainstay of
corporate capital funds for investment. In the
main, these consist of undistributed profits
after taxes (i.e., retained earnings) and capital-
consumption allowances (i.e., depreciation).
Depreciation simply provides funds for the re-
placement of existing capital as it wears out or
becomes obsolete; therefore, depreciation does
not provide for net capital expansion.
From 1957 through 1964, internally gener-
ated funds supplied most of the nation's capital-
expenditure requirements. However, the situa-
Table 1
Sources of Nonfinancial Corporate Financing
1957-1975
($ billion)
Gross Net Funds Internal Funds
Internal Retained Raised in as Percent of
Funds Earnings Financial Markets'" Capital Expenditures
1957 30.6 10.6 11.9 89.1
1958 29.5 7.3 11.7 109.6
1959 35.0 11.6 20.1 95.7
1960 34.4 9.0 12.8 89.3
1961 35.6 9.0 18.8 98.3
1962 41.8 11.1 17.2 95.9
1963 43.9 12.0 21.6 97.2
1964 50.5 16.5 22.2 98.1
1965 56.6 21.3 34.8 91.0
1966 61.2 23.0 36.3 80.1
1967 61.5 19.0 32.5 86.1
1968 61.7 17.5 51.9 82.4
1969 60.7 13.6 57.4 72.6
1970 59.5 8.3 44.1 70.7
1971 68.0 13.3 52.4 78.0
1972 78.7 20.7 69.3 76.9
1973 84.6 31.0 91.6 69.9
1974 81.5 33.5 101.8 64.7
1975 103.9 27.7 40.1 108.1
*Includes equity sales
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in the general context of the usual market for
commodities, a high or rising price should elicit
a greater volume of the good in question. How-
ever, financial markets are not quite the same
as the markets for shoes and ships and sealing
wax. Common stocks gain their value from ex-
pectations of the future stream of earnings that
may accrue from ownership in the corporation.
Ifexpectations are favorable for a corporation's
future earning power, this will be reflected in
the market price of its shares.
The relative desirability of a corporation's
shares may be gauged by comparing its price/
earnings ratio with that of other firms. This
ratio, known as the "multiple," embodies the
stock's current market price and the firm's cur-
rent earnings. The value of the stock to the
rational investor is the discounted value of the
stream of future earnings that the stock is ex-
pected to generate. But to paraphrase Keynes,
the actual price is likely to be closer to the ex-
pectations generated by what the "rational" in-
vestor perceives to be the expectations of other
rational investors.
tion changed markedly by 1970, when funds
raised in the financial markets were more than
five times the amount of new equity generated
by retained earnings. This situation reflected a
sharp fall-off in retained earnings, which came
about because ofboththe Viet Nam taxincrease
and the post-1966 profits decline. In the first
period of observations (1957-64), retained
earnings averaged nearly two-thirds of the aver-
age net volume of funds rai~ed externally in the
financial markets. In contrast, in the period
1969-75, the situation was dramatically re-
versed and retained earnings amounted to only
one-quarter of externally-generated funds.
Questions arise also about internally gener-
ated funds as a source of equity. Although re-
tained earnings may remain in the corporation's
possession, this only means that stockholders
are content to settle for the prospect of future
capital gains as opposed to present income in
the form of paid-out dividends. Retained earn-
ings are a highly erratic source of investment
funds, subject as they are to unexpected move-
ments in bothgross earnings and corporatetaxes
(Chart 3). In addition, retained earnings are
the buffer between net profits after tax and net
dividends paid, and corporate policymakers tra-
ditionally try to stabilize dividend payments,
holding them steady when profits fall off and
increasing them less rapidly when profits are on
therise.
On the surface, it would appear that retained
earnings are a cheap source of funds to cor-
porate treasurers. However, a number ofstudies
have shown that the cost of retained earnings,
from the shareholder's point of view, is in the
neighborhood of 10 percent.
8 Retained earnings
are subject to two sets of taxes affecting stock-
holders-the corporate income tax and the cap-
ital gains tax-and IRS data on these tax cate-
gories (Statistics of Income for 1972) indicate
the validity of this 10-percent estimate. Also,
transaction costs must be incurred if the stock-
holder should wish to realize a capital gain by
selling his stock.It
Stock prices and equity sales
Ifshares of common stock were to be viewed
29Another peculiarity of the stock market is
thatitis essentially asecondhandmarket. Stocks
which have traded in the market for some time
are a more-or-less known quantity (i.e., "sea-
soned") and unlike used cars, may command
a premium over new issues just entering the
market. A prevailing high price/earning ratio
for the market in general would seem to create
a hospitable environment for the sale of new
equity shares. However, precisely the reverse
has been true over much of the past two decades
(Chart4).
The combinedprice/earningsratio of the 500
stocks in the'Standard and Poor's industrial in-
dex averaged above 16 throughout the 1958-
70 period, and during most of that time, the
demands upon the equity market were fairly
modest. During 1957-64, nonfinancial corpora-
tions were consistent (if small) net sellers of
equity, averaging $2-3 billion per year. In the
mid- and late-1960's they retired outstanding
stock almost as often as they sold it. But then,
inthe first half of the 1970's, these corporations
paradoxically became substantial net sellers of
equity, selling new issues in the face of a price/
earnings ratio that averaged about 11 and which
dipped below 7 on occasion (Chart 4). In
other words, corporations were reluctant to sell
equity in a period of relatively high stock prices,
and then turned around and marketed shares in
a period of far less favorable prices.
All of this suggests that market conditions
may be only a sec<imdary factor in the decision
to sell stock. Corporate treasurers stayed on
the sidelines during the long period of rising
stock prices, and then entered the market in the
1970's when it was much less amenable to new
issues. This can be explained in terms' of the
desire of financial managers either to reduce the
degree of leverage or, alternatively, to maintain
a given leverage position but with the substitu-
tion of retained-earnings equity for market-
raised equity. (The first explanation accords
with a wish to reduce leverage in an increasingly
risky world.) The steadiness of the leverage
ratio in the 1969-75 period noted in Chart 1
Chart 4
Stock Prices and Net Equity Sales for Nonfinancial Corporations




















Taxes, markets and riskassumption
Several sets of factors influenced the sources
of corporatefinancing over the pasttwo decades,
the first of these being changes in the corporate
income tax. The average or effective corporate
tax rate varied substantially-from 50 to 37
percent.-because of the institution (and sus-
pension) of the investment tax credit, as well
as changes in depreciation accounting and in
tax-rate structure. These shifts had the direct
effect of increasing or constricting the flow of
retained earnings, depending upon the direction
of the tax rate.
The tax rate thus represents another influence
on the cost of funds raised by credit-market
borrowing. Since interest costs are fully deduc-
tible for tax purposes, changes in the corporate
tax rate directly affect the costs of borrowing.





'Reciprocal of net interest times profits after tax.
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The higher rate of return on a leveraged cap-
ital structure carries with it a greater degree of
risk as the costs of debt service rise relative to
income. This is true in a period of price infla-
tion, and doublytruein a recession when pre-tax
profits fall. Dividend payments upon common
stock may need to be trimmed or eliminated if
the profitability of a firm worsens. But since
interest payments are not postponable without
a threat of default, the leveragedfirm in this case
faces more risk than the firm capitalized with
equity. Thus, it should be expected that as firms
come to rely more heavily upon debt as a source
of capital funds, their vulnerability to fluctua-
tions in profits and interest rates would increase
accordingly.
The relationship of changes in the leverage
ratio of manufacturing corporations to their
interest-payment burden is described in Chart
5.
10 Here, as in Chart 2, there is a bifurcation
of observations, with 1957-64 observations
clustering around a debt!equity ratio of 25 per-
cent and 1969 - 75 observations clustering
around a ratio of 44 percent, with the schedule
shifting upward and to the right. During the
latter period, corporations' increased reliance
upon debt in their capital structure increased
their possible exposure, and their high debt/
equity ratio served as an effective ceiling for
leverage. In 1970, when the debt-equity ratio
reached 44 percent, interest costs assumed a
much larger claim upon corporaterevenues, and
net equity sales showed a significant increase.
The close clustering of observations around
the low (25 percent) and high (44 percent)
debt!equity ratios helps illustrate the trade-off
between risk and earnings that was implicit in
the shift in corporate leverage between the two
periods studied (Chart 6). In this comparison,
the spread between return on equity and assets
after taxes is used as a measure of equity earn-
ings, and the net interest cover is used as a
surrogate for risk, with a diminishing coverage
corresponding to an increasing degree of risk.
suggests that corporate treasurers now wish only
to maintain their current leverage position.
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favored equity financing-chiefly through re-
tained earnings-overcredit-market borrowing.
This has been accomplished through a redistri-
bution of the risks related to capital expansion
based upon borrowed funds, Let us say that a
corporation is Iindifferent to the tax rate when
considering the risk of credit-market borrowing.
If the tax.rate is high and bond interest is de-
ductible, the government essentially underwrites
a partof the firm's interest cost and shoulders
a corresponding part of its risk. As the tax rate
faUs, the corporation's net interest cost rises
and the federal share correspondingly declines.
Aslong as interest expense is fully deductible
as a cost of doing business, the corporation in-
come tax will have a differential impact upon
equity and debt financing. However, a declining
tax rate tends to favor equity financing, because
it forces the corporation to absorb a proportion-
ately greater part of the total interest cost. As
the debt/equity ratio rises-and the corpora-
tion becomes more highly leveraged-the inter-
est burden becomes a much more critical con-
sideration, especially during a period of inflation
and rising market interest rates. It should also
be noted, however, that the costs of capital-
whether equity ordebt-both rose in this period
as stock prices fell and the terms of borrowing
grew I \ more onerous. Whether corporations
sought to reduce leverage or to replace the
Percent
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market interest costs, because the government
assumes a share of the borrower's risk to the
extent of the amount of interest deducted. Con-
versely, a lower tax rate increases the net burden
of interest costs to the corporation-as was
seen in 1974-75, when net interest costs con-
tinued to rise in the face of falling market inter-
estrates (Chart7).
Corporate borrowers are also affected by in-
flation, through its impact upon the long-term
interest rate. The long rate was remarkably
constant, around 4V:z percent, in the first half of
the 1960's, when the inflation rate fluctuated
around a base rate of about 1~ percent. But
then as inflation increased, long-term interest
rates increased, and corporate net interest costs
also started to rise. Thus, throughout this dec-
ade of large net borrowing by corporations, the
actual terms of borrowing were working against
them with respect to the interest burden.
The decline in the effective corporate income
tax over the past two decades has, on the whole,
5.0
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32diminished internalflow of equity, the resultwas
the same: they sold more equity into the finan-
cial markets.
Conclusion
Corporatebehaviorover the past two decades
with respectto equitysales is readily explainable
in terms of the institutional structure within
which financial markets function. As a group,
manufacturing corporations followed a fairly
conservative capital-financingprogramfrom the
mid-1950's through the mid-1960's. At that
point,however, they began to expand the debt
in their balance sheets in an attempt to realize
their full profit-maximizationpotential onequity
shares. Fora while they were successful, widen-
ing the spread between the return on equity and
the return on assets. This was altogether in tune
with the temper of the Sixties, when perform-
ance was the name of the game and the bottom
line tookprecedence.
Manufacturing corporations, like other firms,
faced a more difficult situation in the 1970's.
The combination of inflation (with higher in-
terest rates) and declining effective tax rates
increased the exposure of highly leveragedfirms
to both higher market interest rates and cyclical
fluctuations in earnings. And these corporations
r~actedto their problems inthe mannerwe have
seen in recent years.
Allthese changes in corporate financing have
demonstrated in rather dramatic fashion both
the positive and negative aspects of financial
leverage. The events of the past several years
have probably given many painful moments to
corporatetreasurers. Given a world of increased
risks, less leverage may be well advised. Still,
the retreat from the high leverage ratios of 1970
could be rather limited. There are still advan-
tages to be realized if the yield on the total cap-
ital base exceeds the cost of borrowed funds.
The breadth and complexity of financial mar-
kets and the experience and imagination of cor-
porate financial officers have increased apace.
However, corporations in the years ahead will
probably meet their capital requirements in a
more balanced fashion than they have recently,
drawing on both the equity and debt markets as
they keep in mind the main lesson of the 1970's
-leverage can cut both ways.
FOOTNOTES
1. Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, "The Cost of
Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Invest-
ment," American Economic Review, June 1968, p. 267, ff.
2. As long as relatively safe investments are available, the
firm will not be pressed by this limit because the proceeds
of a financing can be used to lower the firm's intrinsic risk.
This process-the firm's deliberate mixing-of safe and
risky investments-is logically no different from issuing
"negative" debt. The only limit on this process is that
debt cannot be less than zero, so that a firm with risky
profits cannot, under equation 1, reduce the risk exposure
of its earnings.
3. For a recent discussion of this point, see Richard A.
Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory
and Practice, second edition (New York: McGraw Hill,
1976), p. 307.
4. Modigliani and Miller, "The Cost of Capital, Corporation
Finance and the Theory of Investment," op.cit., pp. 281-
282.
5. Ezra Solomon, The Theory of Financial Management,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 94.
6. Ibid., Modigliani and Miller, op.cit., p. 275. The loca-
tion of such a point of leveral$e is proximate rather than
precise. Modigliani and Miller, after testing the effect of
leverage on common stock yields for electric utilities and
oil companies, concluded that the results appeared to sup-
port their theoretical construct, but that the empirical evi-
dence was not conclusive. Ibid, pp. 284-287.
7. The debt/equity ratios used in Chart 1 and thereafter
are for manufacturing corporations as reported in the
Federal Trade Commissions' Quarterly Financial Report.
33
The financial information for this group of corporations is
presented in balance-sheet and income-statement form,
with equity and debt shown on the basis of book value
rather than market value. The ratios are presented in the
QFC as equity/debt but are transposed to accord with
the more usual definition of leverage.
8. Martin J. Bailey, "Capital Gains and Income Taxation,"
Taxations of Income from Capital, M. J. Bailey and A. C.
Harberger (Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution, 1969),
pp.11-49.
9. William J. Baumol and Burton G. Malkiel, "The Firms'
Optimal Debt-Equity Combinations and the Cost of Cap-
ital," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1967,
pp. 565-566.
10. The ratio of after-tax profits to interest for nonfinancial
corporations is used here as a measure of the relative
burden of debt service. This ratio is quite different from
the usual accounting ratio, which measures before tax
profits plus interest payments divided by interest payment.
Because of data deficiencies, it was not possible to obtain
both gross earnings and interest payments for manufactur-
ing firms. The "times interest" ratios on an after-tax basis
are much lower than on a pre-tax basis. For example, a
times-interest coverage of 1.0 on a pre-tax basis indicates
that the firm is insolvent, since gross earnings are zero.
On an after,tax basis, a ratio of 1.0 is roughly equivalent
to a ratio of 3.0 on a pre-tax basis, assuming a corporate
tax rate of 50 percent, since interest payments and taxes
have been deducted from gross earnings. In order to make
a lower interest cover correspond to higher risk, the re-
ciprocal of after tax times-interest is used, scaled from
0.1 to 1.0.